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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
JOSEPH SHELTON WILSON,

Case No. 17664

Defendant and
Appellant.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
In this case Defendant has been charged with theft by
receiving in violation of §§ 76-6-408 and 76-6-412, Utah
Criminal Code (as amended), in that he received, retained, or
disposed of the property of another,

k"'.:~'i.'~~!I

that

~!=_1:~?. ?:~n

stolen, or believing that it probably had been stolen, for
the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that said
property was a firearm.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury.

Defendant was found guilty

of theft by receiving and appeals from that judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On or about June 6, 1980 an undercover Provo C_i_ty

polic_~
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officer driving a van, picked up the Defendant and his
who were hitchhiking.

brotne~

They drove around parts of Orem and

Provo that day, during which time the undercover police

ofiice~

~---~------.-~·

mentioned that he was interested in purchasing some firearms.

--------··---·

The Defendant said that he could get the officer as many
- ....---·-·
firearms as he wanted for a flat rate of $50. The officer

---

--

gave the Defendant his phone number and told him to call, and
~
~--,,.--.~~---------··· ..
on the ~lO~h ci~;; of June the undercover officer's partner
received a phone call.

Following the call, the undercover

officer went and picked up the

D;fer:_~ant

at his Orem residence,

and they drove to the Pleasant__ Gro':'.~. a.rea.

They parked behind

some storage sheds, and Defendant left the van and was

%o~e

for about 15 minutes, returning with a .22 caliber fireann.
The undercover police officer agreed to purchase the gun for
$40 and asked the Defendant whether or not the gun was stolen,
to which the Defendant replied that it was.

The gun was later

identified as belonging to Dean Powell of Orem, who had repartee
the gun missing sometime in May of 1?8Q.

The Defendant was

charged in the information with receiving stolen property on
June 18, 1980.

However, all of the evidence at trial suggestec

that the events occurred on June 10.

The jury found the Def en·

dant guilty of receiving stolen property pursuant to §§ 76-6- 4C'
and 76-6-412, U.C.A.

(1953) as amended.
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--3ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE OFFENSE IT CHARGED
DEFENDANT WITH HAVING COMMITTED; THE INFORMATION ALLEGES
THEFT BY RECEIVING ON OR ABOUT JUNE 18, 1980, BUT ALL OF
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TENDED TO SHOW THAT THE CRIME WAS
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED ON JUNE 10, 1980.
The information filed on August 7, 1980 charged the
Defendant with theft by receiving on or about June 18,
1980.

At the beginning of the trial, held on October

15, 1980, the County Attorney requested that the Court
allow an amendment to the information which would change

....

·~.--~--·""--'···

the date from the 18th of June to the 10th of June, due to
a supposed typographical error.
~----

- +____,. .... ____ .• -

The Court allowed this

-~

amendment over the objections of Defense counsel who stated
that he was not prepared to proceed to trial because of
this change.

The Defens!....had prepared testimony and alibi

evidence regarding his whereabouts on June 18.

...
amendment

The Court

---·---··-~---- ~~--------

erred in allowing this

to the information and by

~~--_____.....

allowing the matter to proceed immediately
in
- -·-··- ,__ to_.. ......trial,
....-.
'------- -that Defendant was not allowed to testify as he was_E::,;-~-

pared to do, nor was the Defense

gi~~}~S)esu~=

?EJ>Ortunity

to respond to the new date.
The State charged the Defendant with having

c~ted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

the offense in question on or about June 18.

The evidence pro-

duced by the State at trial showed, however, that the Defendant had corrnnitted the alleged offense on

~une

10, 1980.

During the course of the trial, Defense counsel argued that
the State's evidence was insufficient because of the difference
between the date charged in the information and the date the
Prosecution tried to establish at trial.

The State relied on

the words "on or about" to remedy this problem.

However, this

does not remedy the problem, as illustrated by State v Armstead,
283 S.W.2d 577 (Missouri 1955).

In Armstead

~he

Prosecution

charged the Defendant with receiving money from earnings of
women engaged in prostitution (on or about) December 23.

The

evidence produced on cross-examination of the complaining witness raised the issue of whether the offense was corrnnitted on
December 30.

The Court said:

We cannot believe that jurors of average intelligence would understand the phrase (on or
about the 23rd day of December) as inclusive
of a week's variance in time ... We have said in
Crawf·or·d v Arends, 351 Missouri 1100, 176 S.W.
Zd No. 1, that the words 'on or about' do not
put the time at large, but indicate that it is
s-i:ated with approximate certainty. We further
said the phrase is used in reciting the date
of an occurrence to escape the necessity of
being-bound by an exact date and means 'approxfili'ately', 'about' 'without substantial variance
from', and 'near': Id, at 582.
It is clear from the above quote that it is not necessary in the information that the date be specifically stated.
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---

-5However, it is necessary that the date closely approximate
the actual date the offense occurred.

See State in the

-

interest of R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Utah 1979).

In

defining the variance from the actual date of offense, Utah
courts have been quite
-~,,..,..-

acceptable.

.... - ·- ......

cons_~:}:_ent
,.

-·

in stating that which is

In State in the interest of R.G.B., the Court

held that a variance of one day was acceptable.

In State

v Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978), this Court found
that a variance of two to three days ~':'3.s. ~;iffi£~e.r;~~LC~,S~.!=
to the date alleged in the Complaint.

Further, in State v

Wadman, 580 P.2d 235 (Utah 1978), a variation of approxi-

--

-~-

___

-

mately three days was found between the date alleged in the
----..:--·_.,,.,..
--··--·- ....... '-· - .... -..~_ . --···
.,,,_,,.,,,., _,,,___.,_......-. ...-........"'- ....
Bill of Particulars, and that proved at_ t~i~l. It is instructive to refer to this Court's statement in Wadman after it
said that a variance of three days was close enough:
We do not suggest that a casual or relaxed
attitude ought to prevail concerning the
State's duty to have its evidence at trial
coincide with matters specified in Bills of
Particular, but for reasons given ante, we
perceive no violation of that duty in this
case. Id, at 237.
Of further interest, is the case of State v Neely, 49
P.2d 433, 26 Utah 2d 334 (1971) in which the trial court
allowed an amendment of the date of the offense from the 13th
to the 9th day of the month.

In this case, the Defendant was

also accused of receiving stolen property.

On appeal, this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Court upheld the lower court's ~ecis!on. However, it is
...
-· ' "" __..__._ ... .,_. ___ ....._
important to note that this amendment apparently caused no
-- -- hardship . to Defendant's defense and was only four days in

____

-·~-

·~

---·---~~

duration.
It would appear from the cases cited above that the
most recent Utah cases have not allowed for a variance of
more than two to four days.

In the case at bar we have a

variance of eight days, an excessive difference, and a

------

situation where manifest injustice has occurred.

We have

a situation where an undercover police officer was involved,
making it possible for the Prosecution to set an exact date

'!

and time, which would give the Defense sufficient notice to
adequately prepare.

For this Court to allow a variance of

eight days is to create a situation where the Defendant is
unable to properly defend himself.
-

=->•_.. ,,.,,___ _

It is obvious to any

tr1ar-;t;;-~;;~-~hat during the short time between the amendment of information and the time the trial began, the Defendant and his attorney would not be able to discuss this change,
would not be able to recreate the events of the new date charged
and would not be able to obtain witnesses to verify what
actually occurred on that date.

Thus, since the Defendant was

not able to present the testimony which he had prepared for the
date charged, he was found guilty and had no opportunity to
adequately defend himself.

Thus, the State has failed to
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prove the offense it charged, and the Defendant should at
least be granted a new trial.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THEREFORE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
The Utah Code provides in

§

76-1-501, that:

(1) The Defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such
proof, the Defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words 'element of
the offense' means:
(a) the conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed,
prohibited or forbidden in the definition of the
offense; (b) the culpable mental state required.
Mr. Schumacher in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in support of his motion in arrest of judgment, stated:
The State further failed to prove the offense in
light of the Court's instruction #5, the elements
instruction, which required the jury, before it
could convict the Defendant, to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant had received
a firearm, knowing or believing that it was stolen.
The evidence produced by the State showed the only
receiving of the firearm was that of Officer Price
purchasing it from the Defendant on June 10. Officer
Price testified the Defendant stated the gun was
stolen, but Officer Price also testified that Mr.
Wilson made no statement as to how the gun had come
into his possession. There was evidence the Defendant had stayed in the Powell home on at least one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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previous occasion, and there was evidence
the Defendant's brother lived with the
Powell family, but it is an impermissable
and unsupportable conclusion that Mr. Wilson
ever received the firearm on or about June 18.
The jury is left to conjecture alone as to
whether Mr. Wilson stole the gun himself and
hid it for disposal for a later date, whether
he received it from his brother or a third
party who had originally stolen it and held
it for delivery for Mr. Wilson. Although
the law allows reasonable inferences to be
drawn from circumstantial evidence, there is
no such evidence from which these inferences
could be drawn.
(R.43).
Section 77-35-30, U.C.A. also provides that:
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.
In the case at bar we have an error which substantially led
to the conviction of the Defendant, and cannot be disregarded.
The elements of the crime of receiving as defined in
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-408 are as follows:
(1) A person co11U11its theft if he receives,
retains or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it probably has been
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds,
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding
any such property from the owner, knowing the
property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive
the owner thereof.
The Prosecution failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt
the Defendant's guilt of the above statute for two additional
reasons.

First, the Prosecution failed to prove the Defen-

dant guilty of receiving.

In instruction #6 given to the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9theft was defined in terms of "receives, retains, or
disposes".

The Prosecution produced direct evidence that

the Defendant had disposed of the property of another but
did not show that the Defendant had been guilty of receiving.

During the course of the trial the State produced

only circumstantial evidence as to the Defendant's

pos~es

sion of the firearm prior to giving it to Officer Price.
No evidence was produced as to how the Defendant came into
~------..___-

possession of the firearm.

This proof is not proof beyond

a reasonable doubt, when the offense is defined in terms
of "receiving only", the conclusion that he is guilty is
inconsistent with the evidence produced.

Secondly, the
--~·-·.rl

Prosecution failed to prove that the firearm belonged to
Dean Powell.

During the course of the trial, Mr. Powell

testified that the firearm admitted in evidence was - his.
,
-

Yet, on cross-examination he admitted that there were no
-.
. . .,,,.. .. - . ·- .....
identifying marks, initials, scratches, or serial number
-"'

~-

~

that he could point to which would tell him whether or not
the gun was actually his.

The jury therefore was unable to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was Mr. Powell'.s
firearm.

Because the inferences drawn in order to find Mr.

Wilson guilty were based only on circumstantial evidence,
the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements of the crime of receiving.
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-10The State also failed to make a connection between the
fact that Mr. Powell had a gun which was stolen and that Mr.
Wilson had a gun which he said was stolen and sold it to the
-----~-·

undercover police officer.

The Prosecution attempted to

prove this link by circumstantial evidence that the pistol
had come from an area in Pleasant Grove, that Mr. Wilson's
brother had lived with the Powell family, and that the Defendant and Officer Price had driven past the Powell home a
week before the alleged sale.

This circumstantial evidence

is legally insufficient in light of the fact that Mr. Powell
was unable to identify the gun as his, and therefore the
jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant had received Mr. Powell's firearm.

The Court thus

erred in not granting Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to its authority under § 77-35-23 of Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) to do so.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant in this case was charged in the information with the crime of receiving pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 76-6-401, on or about June 18, 1980.

During trial

all of the evidence presented pertained to events which
allegedly occurred on June 10, 1980.

This resulted in a

discrepancy of eight days between the time charged and that
proved at trial.

This discrepancy is improper in light of
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recent Utah case law, and further was done in a manner
which gave Defendant an inadequate opportunity to prepare
for his defense.

Further, the Prosecution failed to show

a connection between the Defendant and the item stolen.
Thus, the Prosecution failed to prove all of the elements
of the offense charged, and for this reason the conviction
of the Defendant under the above-named statute should be
dismissed and the Defendant discharged.

rb

Respectfully submitted this ~day of September, 1981.
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct
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-/'

day of September, 1981.
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